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 Introduction & Background
• Compressor failure at refining facility in Gulf 
Coast of USA
▫ 6000 HP two stage process gas compressor in catalytic 
cracking process
▫ Catastrophic failure                                                       
occurred  prior to                                                            
shutdown for                                      schedule 
turnaround
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Overall  
View
 Site Visits
• KHE conducted 4 site visits 
▫ Observed failed compressor – documentation
▫ Gathered relevant data – process/mechanical
▫ Interview plant personnel – chain of events
▫ Inspect failed components - metallography
▫ Directed removal of compressor – preservation of 
evidence
▫ Discuss analyses results conducted – Failure scenarios 
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 Failure Site Assessment
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View
North 
View
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View
• Impellers still on rotor
• Sudden case rupture evidence
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Impeller Rub Damage
Bearing Housing Damage Mechanical Seal Damage
• Evidence of rubbing
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Damaged Compressor
Small damage parts
Recreation of Failed Compressor
 • Damaged casing separated by brittle fracture under 
sudden overload 
▫ Most of the case broke into large pieces
▫ No sign of fatigue, corrosion or impact damage
▫ Fracture origin difficult to detect due to brittle nature of 
cast iron 
• Inlet vanes showed signs of thinning and pitting due to 
corrosion but had no effect on the failure
• Corrosion on pipe and cast fittings 
▫ Not  related to failure
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Root Cause Failure Analysis
Metallurgical Assessment
 • No significant changes in measured radial and axial vibration levels 
before failure (maybe due to slow  sampling time)
▫ However, Stage 2 thrust bearing shows significant activity even though failure 
occurred in Stage 1
 Maybe due to coupling of stages or clearances favor loading in Stage 2
• Lower bearing temps suggest bearings loads decreased
• Power trend shows unloading of compressor (decreasing process 
load) at 3:30 am
▫ After 6:50 am power signals visibly unstable
• Motor and compressor power imbalance possible due to:
▫ Increased flow through balance line
▫ Measured pressure ratios lower than actual
▫ Measurement error in flow rate at low flow
▫ Recirculation through Stage 1. 
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Root Cause Failure Analysis
Mechanical Assessment - Vibrations, Bearings, Power
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• Case thermal stresses below case 
strength
• Suction and discharge pipe 
stresses within acceptable design 
stress levels
• Discharge nozzle stresses 
acceptable
Root Cause Failure Analysis
Mechanical Assessment – Thermal, nozzle design, piping
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• 50 lbs projectile piece due to 
explosion not discharge pressure
Root Cause Failure Analysis
Mechanical Assessment – Projectile Analysis
 Root Cause Failure Analysis
Compressor Performance Review – Stage I
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• Surging evidence 
▫ Data from 3:00 AM until failure around 7 PM
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Root Cause Failure Analysis
Compressor Performance Review – Stage II
• Evidence of surging evidence 
▫ Data from 3:00 AM until failure around 7 PM
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• Surge control with spillback valve for both 
stages
▫ Inadequate, response time too slow
▫ Separate surge control systems with short response 
time needed for each stage
Root Cause Failure Analysis
Surge Control Evaluation
 Root Cause Failure Analysis
Failure Scenario Assessment
• At 3:30 am periodic surges started; before 4:00 am a more 
significant surge took place
▫ Compressor more unstable
 Flow readings, amps readings of motor drive and thrust bearing 
temps (no protection)
• After initial surging, erratic DSC trend data
• Another major surge at ~ 6:50 am after reactor shutoff
▫ Possible damage to balance piston or labyrinth seals of 1 Stage 
▫ Compressor became highly inefficient 
▫ 1 stage discharge temp increase while suction temp decreased 
 Probably due to recirculation via internal leak from component 
damage, incipient surge, full surge or gas through balance line
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 • At 7:14 pm another possible significant surge might have cause the 
following failure scenario:
▫ Thrust rotor towards discharge end (no protection)
▫ Impeller contact with stationary components
 Rub damage on backside of third impeller possibly caused upper and 
lower sections compressor failure, allowing air to enter compressor
 Ignition source as well
• Analysis of all data provided strongly suggested the root 
cause of the failure is the surging of the compressor 
without adequate surge protection. 
• Without surging , failure would not have occurred.
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Root Cause Failure Analysis
Failure Scenario Assessment
 Conclusions
• Analysis of all data suggest that surging of the 
compressor without adequate surge and thrust 
bearing (axial displacement and temperature) 
protection were main causal factors.
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 Recommendations
• Modification of compressor surge control
▫ Provide appropriate surge protection for both stages
▫ Surge control with only Stage 2 spillback should be reviewed
• Verify material imbalance around shutdown
▫ Review up and downstream process flows 
• Use performance curves during operation
• Install polytrophic/measured discharge temp alarm
• Install surge alarm 
• Install thrust movement and vibration protection systems
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 Recommendations
• Install on-line gas analyzer 
▫ Account molecular weight variations for suction flow measurements
▫ Improved compressor control
• Install leak detection monitors
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Recommendations were implemented and the replacement 
compressor ran well for several years until the plant was 
shut down and dismantled
